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Similarly it would be hard to say exactly what is, to his mind, the connection between truth and reference to real existence. That truth does not depend upon existence is definitely affirmed (p. 182), and the author consequently holds with Leibnitz that there can be whole systems of "eternal truths" which have no relation to the actually existent. But, like Leibnitz, Mr. Russell fails to make it clear how such mere possibilities are distinguished from the purely arbitrary, or how apart from some indirect relation to the actual perceived order of things possibility itself can have any meaning. To tell the truth, he seems to fall in his desire to avoid a "cheap and easy" identification of truth with fact into an equally cheap and easy denial of any connection between them. At any rate, until further explanation of his own logical position, Mr. Russell must not be surprised if the adherents of the "existential" doctrine of predication charge him with failure to grasp its exact significance and the real nature of the issues at stake. Mr. Russell is clearly right in finding the source of the worst contradictions in Leibnitz in the inconsistency between his view of judgment and his assumptions that the ego is a substance and the external world real, but the contradiction arises precisely because Leibnitz did *not* maintain an "existential" view of judgment. The difficulty in fact is to see how, in the Leibnitian theory, *any* judgment can assert real existence. The length at which I have discussed the fundamental logical problem suggested by the author's line of argument compels me to abstain from referring in detail to the numerous other topics of interest with which he deals. I will therefore only add that the account of Leibnitz's principle of Sufficient Reason is of special value, as it enables the English reader (again, I believe for the first time) to distinguish Leibnitz's great teleological postulate from the jejune variety of the common causal axiom which is frequently confounded with it.

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PROBLEMS OF EVOLUTION. By F. W. Headley. London: Duckworth, 1900. Pp. xv, 373.

In this book Mr. Headley, who is well known to ornithologists as the author of a valuable study on the Structure and Life of Birds, attempts to find a solution of some of the most difficult

problems of Evolution. These are for the most part connected with heredity and variation, and the point that Mr. Headley insists on most strongly is that the theory of natural selection as propounded by Darwin and amplified by Weismann is adequate to explain all the facts. The agency on which Lamarck relied to produce adaptation, the moulding influence of the environment, is decisively rejected by Mr. Headley. In pursuance of this view he carries on a sustained polemic against Lamarck which is not always convincing. Lamarck held that environment produces variation. No, says Mr. Headley, environment can only draw out variations which already exist potentially. But as Mr. Headley goes on to assume the existence of a practically unlimited stock of potential variations in the organism, the difference between the Lamarckian view and his own seems to become mainly verbal. However, these are topics not immediately connected with the interests of this JOURNAL. We proceed to his second part which treats of the problems of human evolution and more particularly of the evolution of morality. Here, we must say at once, Mr. Headley is on ground much less familiar to him than in his first part. The scientific side of the book, so far as we are able to judge of it, possesses high merit, but the ethical part, though not without interest, is decidedly weak and confused. His argument may be summarized as follows: Natural Selection falling with unmitigated impact on individuals is the sole cause of race improvement in the pre-social stage. The aggregation of men into societies is primarily a fresh device of natural selection to promote survival. Presently, however, within the society altruism arises which mitigates the natural penalties and prevents the wicked from being exterminated. At the same time cleverness increases and enables individuals to cheat society to their own advantage. At this critical moment when the altruism and cleverness which society has generated threaten to destroy it, religion steps in, "providing," in the words of Mr. Benjamin Kidd which Mr. Headley adopts, "an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." Thus, it seems, moral decay was checked, but physical decay is still going on. For Mr. Headley will not allow that anything but natural selection improves the physique of a race. Hardship,

vice and disease are rampant in low civilizations, eliminate the unfit and so improve the race. Comfort, good morals and sanitation mitigate the selective process and so are weakening us daily. There will be no remedy but to call in religion once more, and to treat the propagation of weakness and misery as a sin.

This is not a very convincing argument at first sight, and Mr Headley adduces next to no historical evidence in support of it. In fact, the historical evidence would be hard to come by. The account of the way altruism and cleverness undermine primitive society and religion comes to the rescue is all as mythical as the Social Contract. But the oddest thing in Mr. Headley's view is the social beneficence of vice. "Alcohol is a potent force that has much to do with the development of race character: as I have already shown it promotes physical evolution;" that is to say, it kills off the unfit. In short, the more that dirt, disease and vice abound the better for the physical welfare of the nation. This is not a remote deduction from Mr. Headley's reasoning, but a prominent point in it. Such extraordinary conclusions prove that the principles which lead to them are inadequate, and that biology alone is not enough to explain the nature and development of so complex and spiritual an organism as modern society.

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FRANCIS HUTCHESON: HIS LIFE, TEACHING AND POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By W. R. Scott, M. A. (Dub.), D. Phil. (St. Andrews), F. R. S. A. (Ireland), Assistant in Moral Philosophy and Lecturer in Political Economy in the University of St. Andrews. Pp. xx., 296. Cambridge: The University Press.

Dr. Scott in his very modest preface mentions that the present volume arose out of his search for information regarding Hutcheson's life in Dublin. This biographical interest is, one feels in perusing the volume, predominant throughout it, and certainly the author has in this aspect of his work secured a distinct success.

The work is divided into three parts corresponding to the subjects of the sub-title. Chapters I-VII are biographical; IX-XII give an account of Hutcheson's philosophy; while XIII-XIV, the last few pages, along with c.VIII, which introduces the statement